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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
TORTS-DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY MEETS A
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTE
Donald Dippel, a patron of the Sciano tavern, and two other men were
moving a large coin-operated pool table to a position within the tavern where
it could be used. While moving it, the front leg assembly collapsed and the
table top fell on plaintiff's left foot, traumatically amputating two of his
toes. Dippel then brought this action to recover for personal injuries against
the table's manufacturer, sales distributor, owner-lessor, and Tony and
Dottie Sciano, doing business as Tony and Dottie's Tavern, who leased the
table and offered its use to its patrons for a fee. Plaintiff's third count was
against the manufacturer and the sales distributor alleging breach of express
and implied warranties of merchantable quality and reasonable fitness for the
particular purpose of being utilized as a pool table and that plaintiff relied
thereon as an ultimate user. The sales distributor demurred to this charge
upon the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer for the reason that
there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the sales distributor.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopted the rule of strict
liability in tort, for products-liability cases, as set forth in the Restatement
of Torts.' The court concluded that the facts alleged to support the action
on warranty would not be sufficient to constitute a cause of action within the
newly adopted rule of "strict liability," and sustained the demurrer while
granting leave to plead over. Wisconsin thereby became the sixth state in
which the highest court has expressly adopted the rule of strict liability in
tort as set forth in the Restatement, and the eighteenth state to so adopt the
general doctrine of strict liability in tort.2 Dippel v. Sciano, - Wis. 2d
-,155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
1 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965): "(1) One who sells any product
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection(1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller."
2 Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 289, 216 A.2d 189, 192 (1965) ; Dealers Transp.
Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Ky. 1965); State Stove Mfg. Co. v.
Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966); Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1956);
McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967); Dippel v. Sciano, -
Wis. 2d -, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). As to the status of the law in other jurisdictions
adopting the doctrine of strict liability in tort, see CCH PRoDucTs LIABiLITy REPORTER
111 4050-90; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
Msnm. L. Rv. 791, 794-798 (1966).
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Although the doctrine of strict liability was adopted, the real significance
of the court's opinion lies in the fact that the defense of contributory negli-
gence was made available to the defendant. This defense was allowed be-
cause of a desire to utilize the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute,S and
thereby accomplish what the court believed to be a socially desirable alloca-
tion of risks between the plaintiff-user or consumer and the defendant-seller.
Since liability based upon negligence is essential to the operation of the
statute, the newly adopted "strict liability" was treated as "negligence per
se," for the purpose of applying the comparative negligence statute.
After noting the common law basis for requiring privity in an action for
breach of warranty, express or implied,4 the court referred to the cases of
Smith v. Atco Company,5 and Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Company.6 The Atco
case involved an action to recover damages for death and injury to mink
allegedly caused by their coming into contact with a wood preservative manu-
factured by one defendant and sold by co-defendant. No privity of contract
existed between plaintiff and defendants. The court held that "in a tort action
for negligence against a manufacturer, or a supplier, whether or not privity
exists is wholly immaterial."17 While denying plaintiff's prayer for relief in an
action against a retailer for injuries suffered when struck by a toy airplane,
the Strahlendorf court indicated a possible revision in the prevailing law re-
quiring privity of contract for recovery in an action based upon breach of
implied warranty.8 This gradual erosion of the principle of privity con-
sidered in conjunction with the conceptual difficulties attendant to the adop-
S Wis. Stat. § 895.045 (1965). "Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an
action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence
resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great
as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to the person recovering."
4 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 112, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 404 (1842), where
the court, in holding that a third party could not maintain an action against the man-
ufacturer of a mail-coach for injuries sustained due to the defective construction of
the coach because the parties were not in privity, stated: ". . . if we allow this action
it might be the means of letting in upon us an infinity of actions."
5 6 Wis. 2d 371, 94 N.W.2d 697 (1959).
6 16 Wis. 2d 421, 114 N.W.2d 823 (1962).
7 Smith v. Atco Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 383, 94 N.W.2d 697, 704 (1959).
8 Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 435, 114 N.W.2d 823, 831 (1962).
"When this court declared by footnote in Smith v. Atco Co. [supra note 7] that Wisconsin
requires privity in breach-of-implied-warranty cases, it was merely stating the then
present status of our law. This does not mean that this court will adhere to this rule
forever, regardless of the persuasiveness of the arguments made, or authorities cited,
in favor of changing it. However, we do not deem the instant case a proper one in which
to give consideration to this question."
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tion of a theory of strict liability whose remedy is one of "warranty," 9 per-
suaded the Dippel court to adopt the strict-liability-in-tort doctrine.
Aware of the fact that the issue presented by the case was resolved with
the adoption of a theory of strict liability and consequent rejection of the
privity requirement,' 0 the court further held, by way of dictum, that the
defense of contributory negligence would be available to the defendant." In
order to accomplish this unique result the court first stated that "the
liability imposed is . . . akin to negligence per se."' 2 Since the Wisconsin
comparative negligence statute1 3 has been interpreted to permit plaintiff's
failure to exercise ordinary care for his own safety to be compared with
negligence per se,14 the court felt this failure on plaintiff's part could also be
compared to this newly adopted liability because it is akin to negligence per
se. Under the rule promulgated in Osborne v. Montgomery,' 5 the violation
of a standard of care fixed by statute or decision may be treated as negligence
as a matter of law.'0 Since section 402A of the Restatement was adopted by
the Dippel decision, it has become a standard of care the breach of which
9 The court's opinion contains a quotation from Prosser, The Fall oj the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MmiN 'L. Rav. 791, 801 (1966), wherein the common
avenues available to the defendant permitting him to avoid liability in warranty are
set out. While these problems were considered by the court to be prohibitive to the
adoption of a warranty theory of liability, this is true only in the sense that the legal
profession has applied contract rules to an action for breach of warranty. It would
seem that in most jurisdictions an action would lie in tort for breach of warranty even
though the parties have not dealt with one another. See PROSSER, TORTS § 97 at 679
(3d ed. 1964); Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REV. 415
(1911). But in Pierce v. Carey, 37 Wis. 232, it was held that in an action on a simple
warranty the only remedy was ex contractu, whereas an action ex delicto would lie for
breach of a fraudulent warranty.
10 "While this discussion of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and comparative
negligence may be obiter dicta because those issues are not before us on this appeal,
we deem that a reference to the problem is appropriate as a guide for the trial of this
case in the event it is tried upon the theory of special liability of the seller of products
for physical harm to user or consumer as set forth herein." Dippel v. Sciano, - Wis. 2d
-, ,155 N.W.2d 55, 65 (1967).
1Id. at -, 155 N.W.2d at 63.
12 Id. at -, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
1'Ws. STAT. § 895.045 (1965).
14Hales v. City of Wauwatosa, 275 Wis. 445, 82 N.W.2d 301 (1957); Dinger v.
McCoy Transp. Co., 251 Wis. 265, 29 N.W.2d 60 (1947).
15203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
11d. at 240, 234 N.W. at 378. "In all those cases where it is said that, the performance
of the wrongful act being admitted, the defendant is guilty of negligence as a matter of
law or that the act is negligent per se, the case is one which admits of no question as to
reasonable anticipation or foreseeability. These cases are those in the main where the
act amounts to a violation of a standard of care fixed by statute (ordinance) or previous
decision."
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will be treated as negligence per se for the purpose of applying the compara-
tive negligence statute.
While neither comment n of section 402A17 nor Dean Prosser, 8 the Re-
statement reporter, share the court's opinion that contributory negligence
should be allowed as a defense to the liability established by section 402A,
it does not appear that either envisioned the possibility of limiting rather
than precluding liability when the plaintiff's negligence contributed to his
injury. The function of the comparative negligence statute is to diminish the
plaintiff's damages in proportion to the amount of his own negligence.' 9 If
plaintiff's negligence is equal to or greater than defendant's negligence, only
then will recovery be denied. 20
Traditionally, contributory negligence has been held not to constitute a
defense to strict liability.21 Since Wisconsin permits contributory negligence
as a defense to negligence per se,22 the distinguishing features of these two
theories of liability must be explored to determine if any inconsistencies
arise from the present'holding that contributory negligence can be a defense
in part or in whole to strict liability. Strict liability exists whenever defendant
is held responsible for his conduct regardless of his fault.23 But, this is not
to say that he is liable for any injury to the plaintiff that might occur while
he is using the product. Such liability would be that of an insurer and would
require the term "strict" to be interpreted in its absolute sense. Because of
the necessity of proving the product was "in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous ... 24 when it left the hands of the seller, liability is "strict"
only in the sense that the defendant's negligence need not be proven. It is
no longer material that the seller was not responsible for, nor knew or had
reason to know of, the defective condition which was unreasonably dangerous
to the plaintiff. The sale of such a product will be treated as negligence re-
gardless of the degree of care exercised by the seller. This is precisely the
same analysis involved when a safety statute is found to have been violated.25
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n at 356 (1965).
18 Prosser, The Fall oj the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MqNN. L.
REv. 791, 840 (1966).
19 Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
20 Frei v. Frei, 263 Wis. 430, 57 N.W.2d 731 (1953).
21 PROSSER, TORTS, § 78 (3d ed. 1964).
22 Supra note 14.
23 Prosser, supra note 21, § 74.
2 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
25 If plaintiff is a member of the class to be protected and defendant's violation is a
substantial factor in the causation of the resulting injury, liability will be found. Van
Pool v. Industrial Comm'n, 267 Wis. 292, 64 N.W.2d 813 (1954) ; Reubl v. Uszler, 255
Wis. 516, 39 N.W.2d 444 (1949) ; Edwards v. Kohn, 207 Wis. 381, 241 N.W. 331 (1932).
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In a concurring opinion in Dippel, Justice Hallows argued that liability should
be imposed solely in terms of negligence per se, and the court should have
adopted the rationale of Nelson v. Hansen26 and Wurtzler v. Miller.2 7 These
were both dog-bite cases wherein an owners liability statute28 was interpreted.
In the Nelson case the court held:
We are inclined to the rationale that [the statute], did not create a new cause of
action or impose a new liability on owners of dogs by eliminating the basis of
negligence, but merely dispensed with the necessity of proving scienter in cases
where the injury is done by a dog because of a mischievous trait or propensity. 29
But isn't this the same test used to determine strict liability? "In strict
liability, except for the element of defendant's scienter, the test is the same
as that for negligence." 30 Therefore, liability that is labeled "negligence,"
but does not require proof of scienter, does not differ from what the Restate-
ment refers to as "strict."
The legal purist would contend that the strict liability of the defendant
is not negligence, notwithstanding any similarity with the concept of negli-
gence per se, and therefore cannot be compared with the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff. When the defendant is not negligent, the negligence of
the plaintiff cannot be said to contribute. This reasoning is faulty because it
depends on the assumption that the plaintiff's contribution is merely to the
negligence of the defendant, rather than to the injury sustained. The aggre-
gate of the negligence is then said to be the cause of the injury. "It seems
more reasonable to assume that contributory negligence means negligence
which contributes to the injury, rather than to the sum total of negligence
which results in injury."''a In other words, this argument can be avoided by
saying that plaintiff's negligence may be called contributory if it contributes
to his injury. In the case of Taylor v. Western Casualty and Surety Co.,82
plaintiff was walking across a highway when he was struck by an automobile
operated by defendant and insured by co-defendant. The test for comparison
of negligence was set out as follows: "Once it has been established that each
has been negligent, it is then the jury's function to weigh their respective
contributions to the result . . . .13 It seems, therefore, that not only the
degree of negligence of the plaintiff and defendant is compared, but the con-
26 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d 251 (1960).
27 31 Wis. 2d 310, 143 N.W.2d 27 (1966).
28 Wis. Stat. § 174.02 (1965).
2
oSupra note 26, at 119, 102 N.W.2d at 258.
30 Wade, Strict Tort Liability oj Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965).
31 Lowndcs, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEO. L.J. 674, 689 (1934).
82 270 Wis. 408, 71 N.W.2d 363.
331d. at 411, 71 N.W.2d at 365.
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tribution to the result, or injury, is also compared.3 4 Hence the argument that
plaintiff's contributory negligence can contribute only to defendant's negli-
gence and not to the injury suffered has not been accepted in Wisconsin juris-
prudence.
Whether the label attached to the liability involved be one of negligence
or of strict liability, the underlying principle of risk allocation should be
determinative in any decision concerned with the availability of plaintiff's
misconduct as a defense. This approach has been advocated by Dean Page
Keeton as follows:
The mere fact that contributory negligence, except when it involves deliberate
exposure to known danger, does not bar recovery when one is injured by an
abnormally dangerous activity does not mean that the same precise rule should
be applicable to the activity of manufacturing and marketing all kinds of products.
Because the central problem is that of allocating risks, whether contributory negli-
gence of a particular kind should deprive the injured party of recovery cannot be
satisfactorily answered on the basis of the label given to the nature of the strict
liability. It can best be solved on the basis of policy considerations regarding the
allocation of risks, untrammeled by rules and principles applicable to commercial
losses or to physical harm resulting from negligence or abnormally dangerous
activities.3 5
The allocation of risks, which the court determined to be socially desirable,
was paramount to any possible inconsistency of terminology in the Dippel
opinion. The comparative negligence statute was felt to be the best vehicle
to carry out that policy.
A further step taken by the court to advance its notion of a fair allocation
of risk involved the virtual abrogation of the defense of assumption of risk
in products liability cases. Expressed in the negative, the court stated: "At
this juncture we find no reason why acts or failure on the part of the user
or consumer of defective products which constitute a failure to exercise
reasonable care for one's own safety and might ordinarily be designated
assumption of risk cannot be considered contributory negligence." 36 But
what of the plaintiff whose conduct might ordinarily be designated assump-
tion of risk even though it would not constitute a failure to exercise reason-
able care for one's own safety?3 7 To hold that such a plaintiff will be barred
from recovery while another who did not exercise reasonable care for his
84 Campbell, Wisconsin Law Governing Automobile Accidents-Part I, 1962 Wis. L.
REv. 557, 570.
85p. Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 ILL.
L.F. 693, 698.
36 Supra note 10, at -, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
37 Such a possibility has been pointed out in Meyer v. Val-Lo-Will Farms, Inc., 14
Wis. 2d 616, 111 N.W.2d 500 (1961); Scory v. Lafave, 215 Wis. 21, 254 N.W. 643 (1934).
See generally Prosser, supra note 21, § 67; Annot. 82 A.L.R.2d 1218 (1962).
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own safety is allowed to recover"8 may bring about an undesirable result.
While assumption of risk may still be asserted as a defense, the court's lan-
guage makes it clear that if at all possible, it will be treated as contributory
negligence. General dissatisfaction with the doctrine has resulted in a sub-
stantial restriction of its availability in all types of actions in Wisconsin. 9
The court's decision will have its greatest immediate impact on the vari-
ous members of the distributive chain other than the manufacturer. Since
Wisconsin had already eliminated the defense of privity in an action for negli-
gence, the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur usually resulted in a
finding of negligence by the jury-if the manufacturer was the defendant.
Negligence on the part of the wholesaler or retailer could be proved only in
an exceptional case. Liability is now imposed on any seller, if his business
is the sale of such a product, and it leaves his hands "in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous." A plaintiff who is injured by such a product
manufactured by a financially uncertain or insolvent company can now look
to the retailer which may well be a large corporation capable of compensating
him in full.
While the rejection of "warranty" as a theory of liability has the advantage
of avoiding the traditional defenses such as disclaimer and plaintiff's failure
to give notice of breach, the adoption of strict liability in tort will necessarily
involve a vast amount of litigation to fully define the law.
40
John Corbett
88 All plaintiff need prove is that his negligence in assuming the risk was not equal
to or greater than defendant's negligence. Frei v. Frei, 263 Wis. 430, 57 N.W.2d 731
(1953).
39 See, Dippel v. Sciano, supra note 10; McConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962); Colson v. Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387, 113
N.W.2d 21 (1962); Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956);
WIs. STAT. § 895.37 (1965).
40 The caveat to section 402A is but an indication of the many questions yet to be
resolved: "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rules stated in this
Section may not apply (1) to harm to persons other than users or consumers; (2) to the
seller of a product expected to be processed or otherwise substantially changed before
it reaches the user or consumer; or (3) to the seller of a component part of a product
to be assembled." RESTATENENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
